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Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False 
Prison: a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes 
published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I expected some deep insights into W 
in the current volume. There were certainly some good points but overall it was 
profoundly disappointing. All of behavioral science is about our innate human 
nature and since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal 
psychology, I expected this to be front and center in a work written during the 
golden age of evolutionary and cognitive psychology and with much good recent 
work on W appearing. However, one would never guess from this book that W or 
philosophy had any connection with psychology or indeed that there is such a thing 
as evolutionary psychology.  Hence, I cannot recommend Pears works and instead 
provide a framework for rationality totally lacking in Pears (and most writing on 
human behavior).  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
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Reflecting on Wittgenstein (W) brings to mind a comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him) which ran something like ‘Not offering the chair of philosophy to 
Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I think 
of Wittgenstein as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born ten years 
later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the 
same time and in the same part of the world and like Einstein nearly died in 
WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult 
personality who published only one early version of his ideas that were 
confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; completely changed 
his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge of 
his new work in mostly garbled form diffused slowly from occasional lectures 
and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of 
mostly handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short 
paragraphs with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that 
these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes 
in the margins, underlinings and crossed out words so that many sentences 
have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into 
pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of 
capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel 
views of how the universe works and that they then published this material 
with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that 
contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much 
notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a 
mistake and even nonsense and that virtually nobody understood his work, in 
spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that 
many physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive 
summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and 
condensed form that it was impossible to decide what was being said; that he 
was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of 
the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and 
usually erroneous references to him and that many omitted him entirely; that to 
this day, half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who 
really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I 
claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False 
Prison: a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes 
published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I expected some deep insights into 
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W in the current volume. 
There were certainly some good points but overall it was profoundly 
disappointing.  All of behavioral science is about our innate human nature and 
since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal psychology, I 
expected this to be front and center in a work written during the golden age of 
evolutionary and cognitive psychology and with much good recent work on W 
appearing.  However, one would never guess from this book that W or 
philosophy had any connection with psychology or indeed that there is such a 
thing as evolutionary psychology. If we understand that our brain, like our heart 
is governed by genes and functions automatically according to its evolved 
axioms, W and all psychology make sense. If not, then animal behavior is, to 
paraphrase Toynbee, just one damn thing after another. But Pears does not have 
a clue. He starts (page ix) by saying “How can our thought and language 
possibly have internal standards of correctness” and claiming that “This is the 
central paradox of Wittgenstein’s later Philosophy.” Of course, everything in 
our body runs on “internal standards” (genes) and the paradox is that 150 years 
after Darwin, and with our every thought and action manifesting this, there are 
still people who do not get it. He tells us the writings of our greatest natural 
psychologist (which at age 77 and after reading hundreds of books and 
thousands of papers, I still find some of the most exhilarating and brilliant prose 
I have ever seen) are “flat and platitudinous”!! What this means is that, l ike most 
who read W, most of the time he just does not really get the point. 
 
He starts with W’s early work, which, as all know, W later rejected. If you 
understand that it contains W’s first attempts to lay bare the foundations of our 
intentional psychology, and know his later work, the Tractatus mostly makes 
good sense, but if like Pears (and just about everyone else) you do not, then it 
seems bombastic nonsense. 
 
He tells us (p18) that it is very difficult to say what W’s answer to the question 
of linguistic regularity is, but I claim that it is totally transparent—our evolved 
intentional psychology, which W outlined with the greatest detail and clarity in 
over 20,000 pages included in his nachlass, most of it now translated and 
published in some 20 books and several searchable CDROM’s, and several sites 
on the net as well as on Amazon, libgen.io, b-ok.org and p2p. In fact, at the 
bottom of the same page he has a long quote which ends “What this shows is 
that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in  actual 
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cases.” (PI 1 S201). It’s not an interpretation but regularity due to innate rules 
and W makes this point in countless ways throughout his corpus. Pears then 
says that the extra resource is “vaguely human nature” but there is nothing 
more vague about this than about the fact that our blood is pumped by the heart. 
 
On the next page, he says we impose regularities on our thoughts to understand 
the world but our innate psychology is automatic and the cultural extensions 
are trivial (agency, causality, space and time, ontology etc. are not modifiable). 
And so it goes throughout the book—obliviousness to the overweening 
dominance of our evolutionary psychology and conflation of it with our learned 
extensions.  This is of course the almost universal mistake of regarding humans 
as blank slates.  Wittgenstein refutes it on nearly every page, if you know how 
to read him. The best recent refutation of blank slateism is Pinker’s ‘The Blank 
Slate.’ 
 
On p27 he says W rejects the a priori as the source of regularity, citing the above 
passage in PI, but this is clearly wrong in this case and shows a total (but 
extremely common) failure to get W’s constantly repeated point. At the bottom 
of pg 30 he quotes a passage he thinks is “cryptic” but it’s quite clear to me. W  
explains that we are hypnotized by the vague words “grasped in a flash,” which 
have various uses but we know perfectly well what they mean (i.e., how they 
are used in a given context) and that is the end of it. As he says many places, the 
problem is not to find the answer but to recognize it as the answer. 
 
Though there is much of value here as Pears has extensive quotes and good 
discussion, he ultimately always wanders off the path. In his discussion of 
private language, after noting W’s demolition of the concept of the private 
object, he says it’s too far reaching as it could be used to eliminate something 
that “actually did occur” in the mind.  He just does not get that there is no test 
for “actually did occur” in the absence of a public language. Again , on the next 
page (57) he does not understand W’s famous manometer example which 
repeats this same point. Again, he correctly states (p41) that “His leading idea 
is that the language in which we report sensations owes its meaning to their 
connections with the physical world and cannot survive separation from it.” 
But, he does not tell us that this applies to all language about “inner processes” 
(i.e., thinking, believing, intending, imagining, etc.) and that the connections are 
the public criteria, without which we have no way to decide when a term is 
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correctly applied. On p42 he says Stroud made a new interpretation of W’s 
objection, namely that we could not give ourselves an ostensive definition (i.e., 
point to an apple to remind ourself of the word for it) but this seems to me to 
be just another way to state his objection. Isn’t this just the same as saying we 
have no criteria since there is still no test unless it’s shared (e.g., how do we 
know that we remember the word correctly—we could have some mental quirk 
or get hit on the head and not use the right word or use several –this after all 
happens quite normally in our life and the cure is to ask someone or look in a 
dictionary etc.). 
 
Such mistakes are repeated throughout the book and forces us to classify this as 
another contribution to the mountain of literature which gravely misrepresents 
W and by so doing, misunderstands our evolved psychology. 
 
Likewise Chap 4 on W’s treatment of logical necessity shows a near total failure 
to understand him. W commented in great detail from many different 
perspectives and made it very clear that logic, like language, math, music and 
games is an extension of our innate psychological axioms and he explained via 
long explications of examples how this works and how easily we are misled. 
Nevertheless, like most, Pears manages to badly confuse the situation time and 
again. Though W was not entirely consistent and clear (we are after all looking 
at unpublished and largely unedited notes) he spoke many, many times of the 
innate nature of our psychology (and logic) and definitely did not believe we 
“create” it (Pears p67). He pointed out with countless examples how we must 
be born with all the basic capacities of logic, math and language (thought) in 
order to create its myriad extensions. On p71 Pears says we can have no 
conception of reality in its “raw unconceptualized state” which happens if we 
“subtract our own intellectual contribution”, but it was W’s constantly made 
point that this sort of language lacks sense—lacks any clearly defined use in our 
life (e.g., what is the test that distinguishes between a “raw” and “cooked” view 
of a tree?). W noted that nearly anyone who starts to philosophize (i.e., to talk 
about behavior rather than just behaving—i.e., using words in context) 
immediately goes astray and this book, like most, illustrates this continually.  
The very quotes that Pears uses give deep insights into this process, provided 
one has the insight to understand them. One has only to go back and forth 
between the (mostly) surgically precise dissections of examples by W and the 
(usually) vague generalizations by others to see the hopelessness of much 
behavioral discourse. 
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On p74 Pears attributes to W the view that “logically necessary truths are not 
tested in anything like the way that contingent truths are tested” but W clearly 
and constantly showed that there is not, and there cannot be, any test for the 
innate axioms of our psychology since they are themselves the basis for testing. 
On p78 he again shows a fundamental failure to grasp W (and so our intentional 
psychology) when he quotes from his RFM: “The truth of the proposition, that 
4+1=5, is so to speak, overdetermined. Overdetermined by this, that the result of 
the operation is defined to be the criterion that this operation has been carried 
out.” Pears claims that this “new necessary truth is adopted arbitrarily” and that 
this sort of situation created a problem which W “tried, but failed, to solve later” 
but I claim that he solved it splendidly by showing that this “problem” 
instantiates our innate axiomatic psychology, which determines the necessary 
modes of operation of math, logic, language, thought and life. This is the most 
basic point about behavior and everything about life and the world, for nothing 
makes sense except in the light of evolution. 
 
On p91 he claims that W did “less than justice” to our natural tendency to our 
research and “proof in logic as the discovery of necessary truth” but in fact W 
exhaustively explores the operation of and relations between logic, math and 
language as “necessary truths” (i.e., expressions of our innate psychology), and 
states again and again that their extensions (i.e., all of math, logic, music, art, 
language, games etc.) are inventions, not discoveries. Otherwise, we have to say 
that Michelangelo “discovered” David in the block of marble and anyone else 
might have done so as well.  Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics and 
much of his other work explores the ideas of necessity and compulsion to get a 
result vs. prediction of results. We ought to keep in mind that W claims that all 
we can do is to give clear descriptions of how we behave (i.e., use language, logic, 
math etc.) and that we cannot give explanations. Also, W’s point in his later 
work was not that certainty is based on “truth by definition” (Pears p93) but 
rather that if we comprehend a situation at all, the truth or falsity of statements 
about it come free with our understanding. Part of the problem is that Pears 
constantly refers back to the TLP, dragging its confusions into Wittgenstein’s 
later work. 
 
On nearly every page of every book and article in philosophy and to a lesser 
extent in all the behavioral sciences, much of science, politics, religion and 
everyday discourse, we see the same confusions that W so brilliantly described 
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in his works beginning 80 years ago (with clear anticipations in his earliest 
comments nearly a century ago). Whenever people stop using language in the 
normal flow of life and try to step back and talk about behavior (language, 
mind, meaning, god, truth, the world etc.) they nearly always go astray. One of 
the many simple and beautiful statements of this is quoted by Pears (p42):  
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set 
it in relief—but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself 
in the very fact that language can and only does refer to it. For since language 
only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from the world, no 
language is conceivable that does not represent this world.” Wittgenstein 
Philosophical Remarks S47 
 
Of course, we have to pay our dues with years of study to understand this in 
depth—in our bones.  No pain, no gain. 
 
I suggest that those wishing to understand W, or anything deep about behavior, 
might wish to begin with one of his least studied works—‘Remarks on the 
foundations of Mathematics’. It will likely strike most as austere, boring, 
obvious, repetitious and trivial, when it is not hopelessly obscure, but for the 
persistent and perspicacious who approach it as what I claim it is—one of the 
clearest, most careful and penetrating analyses of the basic mechanisms of how 
the mind (language (thought), math, logic) works ever written, it will gradually 
open the eyes in a revelatory manner. The seemingly picayune belaboring of the 
obvious regarding proofs, propositions, meaning, and interpretation, with the 
aim of clearly describing (not explaining as W so often insisted) the actual role 
of these words (concepts) in our real practice, is the pain and the dawning of 
understanding of our mind and our life is the gain. 
 
In the last chapter on ego, though there are many good points, Pears again 
disappoints by failing repeatedly to get W’s point that when it comes to the first 
person point of view and our presence in the world, there are no tests, nothing 
that can make us say “Oh yes I was mistaken –I was not the one who had that 
pain!” E.g., on p125 he says that there are cases where “some doubt is cast on 
the referential character of ‘I’”, and on p127 that he is “unconvincing” and 
“implausible” in describing the difference between the use of ‘I” and “he” but 
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W constantly stresses that there is no possibility of such doubt as the game of 
doubt applies only when there is a test and what test is there for the pain 
belonging to myself? Again, on p128 Pears refers to “the usual criteria of 
personal identity” when W has exhaustively explained that normally we do not 
have any such criteria. 
 
Of course, these topics are by no means easy and we have no choice but to take 
W at his word in each of his raw unedited notes, often isolated from a 
satisfactory context. 
 
However, I have found that as one gets a better acquaintance with him 
(especially using the searchable CDROM of his English books as well as that of 
the entire German nachlass, now on several sites on the net as well as the Bergen 
CD (due for a new edition ca 2021-- 
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf), all widely 
available on the net (libgen.io, b-ok.org and on p2p), I find that W is rarely 
mistaken. W explains with many examples how we are led to misunderstand 
the role of language and give way to the pernicious urge to look deeper. Few 
can accept our innate psychology for what it is and resist that urge and Pears in 
not among them. 
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